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Abstract 
 
This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of tax evasion in Indonesia by 
using game theoretical model and referring to Indonesian Tax Laws. This 
study uses Inspection Game used by Tsebelis and its refinement by Pradiptyo. 
The game played by 2 representative agents, namely taxpayer who represents 
all possible parties that can involve to evade and tax investigator who 
represents all possible parties that concern with taxes, criminal offenses of 
taxes, and law enforcement. In line with the refined inspection game, the 
study finds that increasing the severity of penalty may affect the probability 
of public (taxpayer) to offend (evade) if certain condition fulfilled, according 
to the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the game. Another policy to 
decrease the probability of taxpayer to evade his tax expense is applying tax 
incentives policy. The result shows that tax incentives policy is effective 
rather than increasing the severity of punishment. Because the game is played 
by players whose scope is wide, it is suggested to develop the game into more 
specific players and into the next stage of bribery and extortion game which 
often happen in Indonesia when the taxpayer plays evade and tax investigator 
plays investigate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tax evasion is one of the problems existing in every country in this world. 
As one of the main revenue of a country, the tax could be used for running the 
government and financing development programs. But, it is the fact that every 
country faces difficulties to optimize their tax revenue. As mentioned above, one of 
the difficulties is the number of tax evaders. Along with tax avoidance, tax evasion 
has a negative impact on a country’s economy.  
Unlike tax avoidance, tax evasion is classified as an illegal act. It carries 
with it the risk of penalties and prosecutions under the tax laws, whereas, tax 
avoidance implies a situation in which the taxpayers reduce their tax liability by 
taking advantage of the loop-holes and ambiguities in the legal provisions (Jain, 
1987). Some countries have applied a program to maximize the tax revenue and to 
minimize tax evasion and/or tax avoidance. In 2010, The USA made terms with 
other countries’ financial institution in order to be able to access the database of 
American citizens. The program is known as Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
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(FATCA). Other ways used by countries to increase tax obedience of taxpayers are 
applying tax amnesty, tax holiday, and/or reforming the tax laws.  
In Indonesia, the tax laws reform massively began in 1980’s after the fall in 
commodity prices. Since then, tax revenue becomes the main resource of the 
national budget (Pudyatmoko, 2005:18). The reform produced a tax laws known as 
“The Laws Number 6 of 1983 concerning General Provision and Tax Procedures”. 
The tax authority in Indonesia is Directorate General of Taxes under the control of 
Ministry of Finance. 
Pioneered by Gary Stanley Backer in 1968, an American economist and 
sociologist, many economists develop economics to analyze the phenomena of 
criminal behavior. It assumes that individual is rational which means the central 
element of his rational calculation involves a cost-benefit analysis maximizing 
expected benefits or minimizing expected costs compared to one of legal 
references. Becker (1968) argued that the expected utility of committing illegal acts 
(or crimes) is determined by the probability of being caught and severity of 
punishment. Becker’s argument corresponds to decision theory in which the 
individual’s preference is based on the benefit-cost analysis disregarding other 
individuals. In contradiction to Becker, Tsebelis (1989) argued that the use of 
decision theory to explain the relationship between potential offenders and police 
is not appropriate as both players are rational, thus ideally game theory should be 
used instead of decision theory. Tsebelis’ model was refined by Pradiptyo (2007) 
based on the framework of Criminal Justice Authority in The United Kingdom.  
Considering the above-mentioned studies, this paper aims to create a 
framework using game theoretic model to explain why some tax payers choose to 
evade and why some do not. Considering the tax evader and the tax authority and 
law enforcement agencies or any other entities as the players which interact among 
each other following their inter-dependence strategies, game theory could result in 
equilibrium that implies the player’s probability of choosing the available strategies 
in relation with outcome optimization. The result of this study is expected to be 
very useful for policymaker, especially the tax authority and law enforcement 
agencies, in formulating provisions for preventing tax evasion and also for the next 
studies. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economics of Crime 
The analysis of the Economics of Crime is generally considered to have 
begun with the publication of Gary S. Becker’s Crime and Punishment: an 
economic approach in 1968. The analysis assumes that individual’s decision to 
commit crime is based on his consideration related to the benefits he earns and costs 
he pays (of committing crime). Becker (1968) concluded that a potential offender 
will commit crime when its expected benefits exceed his expected costs. So, 
individual will be deterred from offending if the probability of conviction and the 
severity of punishment rise. The theory is well-known as Decision Theory, under 
the basic theory of rational-choice. 
Another methodology used to explain criminal behavior is Game Theory. It 
is Tsebelis (1989) who criticized Becker’s decision theory and begun with 
analyzing criminal behavior by using game theoretical approach in 1989. Tsebelis 
(1989, 1991, 1993) argued that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment 
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reduced the probability of criminal justice authority in enforcing the law but it did 
not affect the probability of individuals from offending. The situation of the 
Tsebelis’ game concerning the criminal behavior is widely known as Inspection 
Game.  
Some economists tend to use game theory than decision theory in analyzing 
phenomena in criminal. Pradiptyo (2007) refined the Inspection Game proposed by 
Tsebelis and concluded that any attempt to increase the severity of punishment is 
going to reduce the likelihood of offending if certain condition hold. In addition, he 
showed that crime prevention initiatives are more effective rather than increasing 
the severity of punishment. Some applicable studies in Indonesia about the game 
theoretical approach in analyzing offending behavior were made by Nugraha (2012) 
who explained law enforcement mechanism of tackling money laundering in 
Indonesia, Maytandi (2016) who modeled corrupt activities within public 
procurement process of goods and services in Indonesia.  
 
Game Theory 
Rasmusen (2006:10) stated that Game Theory is a study concerning 
individual’s actions in decision making, whether he has to do or not to do 
something, and He is conscious that his actions affect the other. Three basic 
assumptions of game theory are individualism, rationality, and mutual 
interdependence (Romp, 1997:1-4). Individualism means that players in game 
theory are considered to take action as rational individual decision-makers. 
Rationality means that the players assumed to be rational according to their self-
interest. Mutual interdependence means that the strategy chosen by one player is 
determined by the strategy of others. The optimal solution of the game theory is 
named Nash Equilibrium. It can be defined as a combination of players’ strategies 
which are the best response to each other (Carmichael, 2005:36). Nash Equilibrium 
can be distinguished into two, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE), and Mixed 
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE). PSNE is the one in which each player only has 
one particular strategy. However, in MSNE, the player has some choices of strategy 
that do not absolutely dominate among another. 
The common model of game used by crime economists is Inspection Game. 
An inspection game is a mathematical model of a non-cooperative situation where 
an inspector verifies that another party, called inspectee, adheres to legal rules. The 
inspector intends to deter illegal activity on the part of the inspectee and, should 
illegal activity nevertheless take place, detect it with the highest possible probability 
and as soon as possible (Avenhauss, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 1. Inspection Game 
Source: Tsebelis (1989) 
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An Inspection Game (Figure 1.) shows that there is no Pure Strategy Nash 
Equilibrium. Instead, the inspection game has a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium. 
Considering p* as the probability of public to offend and q* as the probability of 
police to enforce the law, The MSNE of the game describes as the following 
equations: 
𝑝∗ =  
𝑑2−𝑐2
𝑎2−𝑏2+𝑑2−𝑐2
       (1) 
 
𝑞∗ =  
𝑏1−𝑑1
𝑏1−𝑑1+𝑐1−𝑎1
       (2) 
 
Legal Review 
 Tax evasion is declining to pay taxes, including income taxes, employment 
taxes, sales and excise taxes, other federal, state, or local taxes, which are owed. It 
carries with it the risk of penalties and prosecutions under the tax laws (Jain, 1987). 
In Indonesia, tax evasion provisions have been coded in Tax Laws. Articles 38, 39, 
39A and 41B in “The Laws Number 28 of 2008 Concerning the Third Amendment 
of the Laws Number 6 of 1983 Concerning General Provision and Tax Procedures” 
provide an explanation of the Criminal Provisions (of taxes)1. 
 Articles 38, 39, 39A and 41B define implicitly those who are categorized as 
tax evader, along with the penalties and sanctions which may vary. The articles state 
that the tax evader is not just taxpayers, but also those who obstruct or hinder the 
investigation of tax evasion case. Referred to article 44, the authority of 
investigating criminal tax offenses belongs to officials of the Directorate General 
of Taxes2. Then, the result of the investigation is submitted to public prosecutor 
through the State Police Investigation Official pursuant to the provisions of the 
regulating Law on Criminal Procedures.  
 
METHOD 
This study uses game theoretical approach to analyze and to model the 
mechanism of combating tax evaders in Indonesia by referring to the Tax Laws 
concerning General Provisions and Tax Procedures in Indonesia. This study will 
expand Tsebelis’ Inspection Game and its refinement which is refined by Pradiptyo 
(2007). In terms of aggregated payoffs, Pradiptyo’s model is similar with Tsebelis’. 
But in Pradiptyo’s, each element in the payoff matrix is then presented into more 
specific identity as following: 
a1 = UO – UD        (3) 
b1 = UO + UR        (4) 
c1 = d1 = UR       (5) 
a2 = BE – CE – CS       (6) 
b2 = 0         (7) 
c2 = BR – CE       (8) 
d2 = BR       (9) 
 
Where: 
UO  = Immediate utility arises from committing an offence. 
UD  = Disutility of serving direct punishment (e.g., imprisonment, fine,  
               community service). 
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UR  = Positive reputational effects to individuals for not being convicted. 
               deterrence effects arise due to enforcement of the law. 
 
BE  = Benefits of enforcing the law including the detection of incidents and any 
BR  = Reputational benefits in achieving objectives set by the Criminal Justice  
               Authority. 
CE  = Costs of enforcement of the law including, for instance, costs of   
               investigation and costs to dispatch police officers in certain areas. 
CS  = Costs to deliver courts’ sentences, including direct and indirect  
            punishments (e.g., the list of positions that cannot be taken by ex- 
offenders, the length of probationary period, and the length of period 
offenders have to report to police about their mobility). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The Game of Tax Evasion 
This study model the phenomenon of tax evasion as a 2-player 2x2 
simultaneous inspection game played by representative agents, namely Taxpayer 
and Tax Investigator. The game assumes that hindering parties are integrated within 
taxpayers because above-mentioned legal review states that those who obstruct or 
hinder the investigation of tax evasion are implicitly classified as tax evaders, 
likewise, it assumes that tax investigator is also representing all other justice 
authorities concerning violation of taxes. Hence, strategies of Taxpayer are “Evade” 
or “Not Evade” and the strategies of Tax Investigator are “Investigate” or “Not 
Investigate”. The term ‘investigate’ means not only the process of investigation but 
also prosecution and other relevant process concerning law enforcement in taxation. 
Let us begin with the taxpayer perspective. By committing evasion, the 
taxpayer will absolutely gain immediate utility (UE), such as the money earned from 
unpaid or underpaid taxes (if he/she fails to file tax return or files a false an 
incomplete tax return). If the taxpayer is getting investigated, he/she will acquire 
immediate disutility (DE) meaning that he/she will be prosecuted under the criminal 
laws and then will receive penalty(s). UE – DE will be taxpayer’s net benefit of 
evading taxes while the investigator plays ‘investigate’. If he/she does not evade 
the tax expense, he/she will receive benefits in terms of positive reputation benefits 
(UR), i.e. known as an obedient taxpayer. However, when he/she evade the tax 
expense while the investigator decide not to conduct an investigation, he/she will 
enjoy the reputational benefits along with the immediate utility (UE + UR). 
From Tax Investigator’s perspective, investigating the suspicious taxpayer 
or tax return will produce benefits of investigation (BI). The benefits are, for 
example, the detection of cases, the information gathered about revenue loss, and 
deterrence benefits arising. On the other hand, conducting investigation until 
prosecution and execution is costly (CI). The Directorate General of Taxes under 
the control of Ministry of Finance, as a tax authority in Indonesia, has to incur costs 
for time and human resources dedicated for inspecting and auditing the suspicious 
taxpayer (or tax return) and submitting the investigation report to law enforcement 
agencies. The investigator will get and pay nothing if he/she does not investigate 
when taxpayer commits evasion. In the case when taxpayer does not evade his/her 
tax expense, the tax investigator will gain reputational benefits (BR) from his/her 
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institution because of achieving the objectives from his/her chief leader (to 
eradicate and prevent evasion), whether or not he/she conducts an investigation. 
The normal form of the game is shown by the following figure: 
 
                                                Tax Investigator 
 
 
 
 
Taxpayer 
 Investigate 
(y) 
Not Investigate 
(1-y) 
Evade 
(x) 
UE – DE , BI – CI UE + UR , 0 
Not Evade 
(1-x) 
UR , BR – CI UR , BR 
 Where: UR > UE – DE, UE + UR > UR and BI – CI > 0 , BR > BR – CI 
Figure 2. Inspection Game: Tax Evasion 
 
Consider y to be the probability of the investigator to investigate the evasion. 
The taxpayer tends to commit evasion if: 
(UE – DE) y + (UE + UR) (1 – y) ≥ UR y + UR (1 – y) 
UE ≥ y (DE + UR)                        (10) 
Equation (10) implies that the taxpayer will evade the taxes if and only if the 
immediate utility (UE) of committing evasion exceeds the expected disutility of 
getting investigated and the expected loss of reputational effects [y (DE + UR)] 
Similarly, the method is used by the investigator to decide whether to 
investigate. Considering x as the probability of the taxpayer to evade, thus the 
investigation will conduct if: 
(BI – CI) x + (BR – CI) (1 – x) ≥ BR (1 – x) 
BI x ≥ CI             (11) 
Equation (11) proposes that the investigator will investigate if and only if the 
expected benefits of investigation [BIx] exceed the cost of investigation (CI).  
Adopting the equations (1) (2), we find that the MSNE of the game are: 
 
𝑥 =  
𝐵𝑅−(𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝐼)
𝐵𝐼−𝐶𝐼−0+𝐵𝑅−(𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝐼)
=  
𝐶𝐼
𝐵𝐼
    (12) 
 
𝑦 =  
𝑈𝐸+𝑈𝑅−𝑈𝑅
𝑈𝐸+𝑈𝑅−𝑈𝑅+𝑈𝑅−(𝑈𝐸−𝐷𝐸)
=  
𝑈𝐸
𝑈𝑅+𝐷𝐸 
   (13) 
Whereby x, y  (0,1) 
 
Where: 
UE  = Immediate utility arises from committing evasion. 
DE  = Disutility of serving direct punishment because of evading (e.g.,  
               imprisonment, fine, community service). 
UR  = Positive reputational effects to individuals for not being investigated and  
               convicted. 
BI  = Benefits of investigating including the detection of incidents and any  
               deterrence effects arise due to enforcement of the law. 
BR  = Reputational benefits in achieving objectives set by the Justice Authority. 
CI  = Costs of investigating, including, for instance, times spent for enforcing  
law, costs of investigation, costs to hiring tax officers, and other relevant 
costs to process law enforcement. 
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Equation (12) describes that the probability of taxpayer to evade the taxes 
negatively correlates with the benefit and cost ratio of investigating the suspicious 
taxpayer (or tax return), whereas, equation (13) implies that the investigator’s 
probability to conduct investigation has positive correlation with the indirect utility 
of evading the taxes. Conversely, it has negative correlation with the disutility of 
getting investigated and the loss of reputational benefit of getting investigated. 
 The equation (12) could also be interpreted that, given the cost of 
investigating, the probability of taxpayer to evade the taxes increases as the benefits 
of conducting investigation decreases. It means that in order to prevent the tax payer 
to evade taxes, BI must increase. On the other hand, the equation (13) shows that 
the investigator will not investigate if the direct and/or reputational disutility 
increases, given the immediate utility of evading taxes. The following section 
discusses the impact of policies made by the government to eradicate and prevent 
tax evasion. 
 
Increasing the Severity of Penalty(s) 
It has explained and coded in Indonesia Tax Laws (article 44) that the 
authority to investigate the crime of taxation belongs to tax officers (of Directorate 
General of Taxes) who are given a special authority. However, through ministry of 
finance, the tax authority could propose laws amendments concerning taxes. Hence, 
the authority which in this game is represented by tax investigator is assumed to be 
able to increase the severity of penalty (DE).  
Considering the above-mentioned situation, the investigator can increase 
the disutility of getting investigated (DE) or the loss of reputational benefits (UR) or 
both. Suppose that justice authority concerning taxes decides to increase the 
severity of direct penalty (DE*), such as increasing the duration of imprisonment 
and increasing the fines levied upon evaders through Law amendments, ceteris 
paribus.  
An attempt to increase the severity of penalties is costly, especially when it 
is done through law amendments. Based on taxpayer’s observation, the policy 
increases the costs of investigation (CI*) and make a change in the benefits of 
investigation (BI*). Then DE* > DE, CI* > CI, and BI* is unclear whether BI* > BI 
or BI* < BI or BI* = BI.  
Let x* and y* denote the new equilibrium, considering the recent changes, 
then:  
                 𝑥∗ =  
𝐶𝐼
∗
𝐵𝐼
∗       (14) 
                 𝑦∗ =  
𝑈𝐸
𝑈𝑅+𝐷𝐸
∗ 
       (15) 
Where x*, y* (0,1) 
Form the equations (14) (15), It is shown that the probability of investigator to 
investigate the evasion (y*) will decrease since UR + UD* > UR + UD. On the 
contrary, there are three possible changes of the probability of taxpayer to evade. 
Increasing the severity of penalty has an ambiguous impact. It may reduce the 
probability of taxpayer to evade, however, to some extend, it may increase the 
probability of taxpayer to evade, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. 
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x* < x, if:   
BI* – CI* > BI – CI           
(16) 
x* > x, if 
BI* – CI* < BI – CI           
(17) 
and x* = x, if 
BI* – CI* = BI – CI           
(18) 
 
Tax Incentives Policy 
The tax incentives are widely used by countries, including Indonesia, to 
encourage people or business enterprise to be obedient taxpayers, so do of 
investment. Investment is expected to be increasing, and the people who invest 
become obedient taxpayers.  
Back to the game, suppose that tax authority makes policy to give tax 
incentives. The policy is exactly enjoyed by taxpayer who does not evade or, in the 
other words, the obedient taxpayer. The evader that is not convicted is also get the 
benefits because the evader not being convicted is freely to enjoy the capital inflow 
gained from the application of the policy (the incentive benefits denote by PE, such 
that PE > 0). From the tax authority’s perspective, represented by tax investigator, 
the incentives enjoyed by taxpayer increases the other cost variable in his/her 
payoffs (denotes by CPI, such that CPI > 0). The addition cost variable means the 
cost of making the policy, such as socialization costs and other cost relevant to the 
policy-making and applying it. The game becomes the following: 
 
                                                Tax Investigator 
 
 
 
 
Taxpayer 
 Investigate 
(y) 
Not Investigate 
(1-y) 
Evade 
(x) 
UE – DE , BI – CI  UE + UR + PE , 
 – CPI 
Not Evade 
(1-x) 
UR + PE , BR – CI 
– CPI 
UR + PE , BR – CPI 
Where: UR + PE > UE – DE , UE + UR + PE > UR + PE and BI – CI > – CPI , BR – CPI > BR – CI – 
CPI 
Figure 3. Inspection Game: Role of Incentives Policy 
 
As the previous 2 games, the inspection game with tax incentives policy has no 
pure strategy. Therefore , the game has mixed strategy: 
 
𝑥∗∗ =  
𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝑃𝐼−(𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝐼−𝐶𝑃𝐼)
𝐵𝐼−𝐶𝐼−(−𝐶𝑃𝐼)+𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝑃𝐼−(𝐵𝑅−𝐶𝐼−𝐶𝑃𝐼)
=  
𝐶𝐼
𝐵𝐼+𝐶𝑃𝐼
   (19) 
 
𝑦∗∗ =  
𝑈𝐸+𝑈𝑅+𝑃𝐸−(𝑈𝑅+𝑃𝐸)
𝑈𝐸+𝑈𝑅+𝑃𝐸−(𝑈𝑅+𝑃𝐸)+𝑈𝑅+𝑃𝐸−(𝑈𝐸−𝐷𝐸)
=  
𝑈𝐸
𝑈𝑅+𝐷𝐸+𝑃𝐸 
  (20) 
 
Where x**, y** (0,1) 
 Jurnal Ekonomi dan Studi Pembangunan, 9 (2), 2017 
  ISSN 2086-1575   E-ISSN 2502-7115 
198 
 
Equation (19) obviously shows that the probability of taxpayer to evade is 
x** < x. Although the policy is also decrease the probability of tax authority to 
conduct investigation (equation 20 shows that y** < y), it doesn’t matter, given the 
level of law enforcement and penalty hold. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By using the game theoretical approach, this study of tax evasion 
phenomenon in Indonesia concludes that in order to decrease the probability of 
taxpayer to evade his tax expenses can be done by increasing the severity of penalty 
and applying tax incentives policy, referring to Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
(MSNE). However, if the tax (justice) authority decides to increase the severity of 
penalty, the probability of taxpayer evading his tax expenses is unclear, whether it 
is increase, decrease, or constant. Another result of this study show that applying 
the tax incentives is more effective to prevent taxpayer than increasing the severity 
of penalty.  
 This study constructs the game by using the Indonesian Tax Laws which 
can be affirmed by empirical findings and case studies. There are many assumptions 
in this game which exactly can be minimized. For example, the game is represented 
by 2 agents that include many parties or agencies concerning taxes, criminal act of 
taxes, and law enforcement. Actually, the game can be played by many players. The 
analysis can be developed to some specific games. For instance, after the basic 
game played, the game can be continued to bribery or extortion game because it is 
the fact that, in Indonesia, such activities and cases—bribery and extortion—are 
easily found in criminal justice.  
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